Other-regarding behavior under collective action

Katerina Sherstyuk, Nori Tarui, Melinda Podor Wengrin, Jay Viloria and Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Additional contact information
Melinda Podor Wengrin: University of Hawaii at Manoa
Jay Viloria: California Institute of Technology
Tatsuyoshi Saijo: Kochi University of Technology

No 201404, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: In many collective action settings, such as decisions on public education or climate change mitigation, actions of a group have welfare consequences for themselves as well as their followers. We conduct laboratory experiments with two-stage predecessor-follower prisoners' dilemma and coordination games with dynamic externalities to study whether concerns for the followers' welfare affect the predecessors' behavior. We find that predecessors often give up own payoffs to avoid imposing negative externalities on the followers, but not to generate positive externalities for the followers. A concern for the followers aligned with own group payoff maximization motive helps to resolve socialdilemma and coordination problems; yet, a conffict in motives greatly exacerbates both free-riding and coordination on the payoff-inferior equilibrium. We also find strong evidence of social learning: the followers tend to blindly mimic their own predecessor, but act opposite to their match's predecessor, no matter whether these actions are welfare-improving or not.

Keywords: economic experiments; other-regarding behavior; collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_14-4.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Other-regarding behavior under collective action (2014)
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