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Competitive Search with Ex-post Opportunism

Pedro Gomis-Porqueras, Benoit Julien and Liang Wang

No 201607, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a frictional market where buyers are uncoordinated and sellers cannot commit ex-ante to either a per-unit price or quantity of a divisible good. Sellers then can exploit their local monopoly power by adjusting prices or quantities once the local demand is realized. We find that when sellers can adjust quantities ex-post, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium where the increase in the buyer-seller ratio leads to higher quantities and prices in equilibrium. When sellers post ex-ante quantities and adjust prices ex-post, a symmetric equilibrium does not exist.

Keywords: Competitive Search; Price Posting; Quantity Posting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dge, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_16-07R.pdf First version, 2016 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competitive Search with Ex-post Opportunism (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Competitive Search with Ex-post Opportunism (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Competitive Search with Ex-post Opportunism (2016) Downloads
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