Does Public Redistribution Crowd Out Private Transfers? Evidence from Four Countries

Alistair Cameron (), Lata Gangadharan, Pushkar Maitra (), Paulo Santos () and Joseph Vecci ()
Additional contact information
Alistair Cameron: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne
Lata Gangadharan: Monash University [Clayton]
Pushkar Maitra: Monash University [Clayton]
Paulo Santos: Monash University [Clayton]
Joseph Vecci: GU - Göteborgs Universitet = University of Gothenburg

CERDI Working papers from HAL

Abstract: Together with private transfers, centralized redistribution policies form the backbone of social welfare systems worldwide. Examining their interplay is therefore crucial for understanding and addressing inequality. We investigate the relationship between private transfers and public redistribution policies using an experiment with nearly 4000 participants from Germany, India, Indonesia and the USA. The experiment creates large inequalities, then introduces one of four centralized redistribution regimes to address the inequality. Our findings reveal that no redistribution policy changes private pro-social or anti-social transfers, compared to an environment without centralized redistribution. Structural estimates show that egotistic, rather than social motives drive private transfers, and that inequality aversion is unaffected by redistribution policies, thus explaining the lack of a private response. This suggests that governments possess an additional degree of freedom in pursuing social safety nets.

Keywords: Redistribution; Inequality Aversion; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pbe, nep-sea and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://uca.hal.science/hal-04811881v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://uca.hal.science/hal-04811881v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cdiwps:hal-04811881

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CERDI Working papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - CERDI - Université Clermont Auvergne ().