Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail

Clémence Berson

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Discrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a nonzero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms.

Keywords: Discrimination; oligopsony; wage gap; oligopsonie; différentiels de salaire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00605976v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Revue Economique, 2011, 62 (3), pp.409-417. ⟨10.3917/reco.623.0409⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00605976v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail (2011)
Working Paper: Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail (2011)
Working Paper: Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00605976

DOI: 10.3917/reco.623.0409

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().