Intermodal competition: studying the pricing strategy of the French rail monopoly

Patricia Perennes ()
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Patricia Perennes: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In most countries, passengers' rail transportation is characterized by a monopoly. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the monopolist-usually the national company-does not face competition, in the form of intermodal competition (planes, cars). This article focuses on the French national rail company (SNCF) that still has a monopoly on national passenger traffic. It analyses SNCF's pricing behavior on most of the origin/destination pairs it operates with high speed trains to/from Paris. It takes into account the fact SNCF enjoys a limited leeway to set its prices because ticket prices are still regulated in France. The existence of such a price cap regulation is an opportunity for an economist to analyse how a transportation company facing intermodal competition sets its prices. Usually, such an analysis is hard to conduct since transport prices are set following yield management principles.

Keywords: Railroad; pricing strategy; intermodal competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-reg and nep-tre
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Published in Transport Research Arena 2014, Apr 2014, Paris, France

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01272287

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