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Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population

Philippe Choné and Stephane Gauthier

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty pertains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision of service should be distorted upwards when the first-best efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high.

Keywords: provision of service; service; treatment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01300824v1
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2017, 19 (3), pp.732-738

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogenous Population (2014) Downloads
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