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Unilateral Dominance and Social Discounting

Xiangyu Qu () and Bach Dong Xuan
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Xiangyu Qu: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Bach Dong Xuan: UEL - University of Economics and Law [Vietnam National University, HCM] - VNU-HCM - Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City / Đại học Quốc gia TP. Hồ Chí Minh

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper addresses the intricate challenge of establishing social discount rates across far-reaching generations, particularly in the face of divergent social viewpoints. We propose a principle of future-improved unilateral dominance to characterize social discount rates. Despite its divergence from traditional principles, our principle prioritizes the welfare of distant generations, resonating with a minority concern within society. Our findings indicate that society adhering to this principle exhibit greater patience and future-oriented concern than any individual. TThis approach, contingent upon the preferences of current generations, offers theoretical pathways to enhance considerations for the welfare of the distant future in the context of long-term environmental projects or activities.

Keywords: Social discounting; future-improved unilateral dominance; long-term environmental projects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea
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