Remanufacturing

Sophie Bernard

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.

Keywords: Remanufacturing; competition; environmental regulation; Porter hypothesis; règlementation environnementale; hypothèse de Porter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00594051v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2011

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00594051v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Remanufacturing (2011)
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011)
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011)
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011)
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011)
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011)
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00594051

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().