On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium

Messaoud Deghdak () and Monique Florenzano
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Messaoud Deghdak: Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées et Modélisation - Département de Mathématiques

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, we establish the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium for games with n persons in infinite dimensional strategy spaces in the case where the payoff function of each player is quasi-concave. Moreover, we study the continuity of Berge's strong equilibrium correspondence and prove that most of Berge's strong games are essential.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; strong Berge equilibrium; fixed point; essential games.; Equilibre de Nash; équilibre fort de Berge; point fixe; jeux essentiels. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Published in 2011

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium (2011)
Working Paper: On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00611851

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