Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: Competition and regulation in north American vs. European professional team sports leagues

Wladimir Andreff ()
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Wladimir Andreff: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: The paper presents the differences between the design of a closed and an open team sports league. Then it compares the theoretical models of a closed league with profit maximizing clubs and an open league with win maximizing clubs. Both models are now outdated by a Nash equilibrium model which is briefly sketeched. In the case of open leagues, a disequilibrium model seems more appropriate and a first attempt at elaborating it are exhibited.

Keywords: economics of sport; professional sports leagues; organization; competitive balance; competition; regulation; comparative economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-spo
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Published in The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 2011, 8 (1), pp.3-27

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00677436

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