A coalition formation value for games in partition function form

Michel Grabisch and Yukihiko Funaki ()

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.

Keywords: game theory; coalition formation; games in partition function form; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00690696v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, pp.175-185

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Journal Article: A coalition formation value for games in partition function form (2012)
Working Paper: A coalition formation value for games in partition function form (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00690696

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