On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship

José De Sousa () and Xavier Fairise ()

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Does formal contracting foster cooperation in a buyer-supplier relationship? In line with the literature, we find that a renegotiable contract with relationshipspecific joint investments does not make it possible to reach the first-best. However, we show that a renegotiable contract may induce more cooperation than an informal arrangement can. This result may help to understand how cooperation emerges in Japanese procurement practices, which typically involve relationshipspecific joint investments and renegotiable contracts.

Keywords: incomplete contracts; relationship-specific investments; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00870060
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer–supplier relationship (2014)
Working Paper: On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer–supplier relationship (2013)
Working Paper: On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00870060

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