Uniformity and games decomposition

Joseph Abdou, Nikolaos Pnevmatikos () and Marco Scarsini
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Nikolaos Pnevmatikos: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We introduce the classes of uniform and non-interactive games. We study appropriate projection operators over the space of finite games in order to propose a novel canonical direct-sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the uniform with zero-constant, the non-interactive total-sum zero and the constant components. We prove orthogonality between the components with respect to a natural extension of the standard inner product and we further provide explicit expressions for the closet uniform and non-interactive games to a given game. The, we characterize the set of its approximate equilibria in terms of the uniformly mixed and dominant strategies equilibria profiles of its closet uniform and non-interactive games respectively.

Keywords: decomposition of games; projection operator; uniformly mixed strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-sea
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01147442v2
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Published in 2017

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Related works:
Working Paper: Uniformity and games decomposition (2017)
Working Paper: Uniformity and games decomposition (2017)
Working Paper: Uniformity and games decomposition (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01147442

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