Referenda Under Oath

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini () and Jason Shogren
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Stéphane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.

Keywords: Dichotomous Choice Mechanism; Preference revelation; Oath; Hypothetical bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01301784v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published in Environmental and Resource Economics, 2017, 67 (3), pp.479-504. ⟨10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Referenda Under Oath (2017)
Working Paper: Referenda Under Oath (2017)
Working Paper: Referenda Under Oath (2017)
Working Paper: Referenda under Oath (2010)
Working Paper: Referenda under Oath (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01301784

DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5

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