Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach

Joseph Abdou and Nikolaos Pnevmatikos ()
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Nikolaos Pnevmatikos: UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We study the asymptotic value of a frequency-dependent zero-sum game with separable payoff following a differential approach. The stage payoffs in such games depend on the current actions and on a linear function of the frequency of actions played so far. We associate to the repeated game, in a natural way, a differential game and although the latter presents an irregularity at the origin, we prove that it has a value. We conclude, using appropriate approximations, that the asymptotic value of the original game exists in both the n-stage and the λ-discounted games ant that it coincides with the value of the continuous time game.

Keywords: stochastic game; frequency dependent payoffs; continuous-time game; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Published in 2018

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymptotic Value in Frequency-Dependent Games with Separable Payoffs: A Differential Approach (2019)
Working Paper: Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach (2018)
Working Paper: Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach (2018)
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