Externalities in Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules

Philippe Bich () and Rida Laraki ()
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Philippe Bich: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Rida Laraki: X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Endogenous sharing rules were introduced by Simon and Zame [16] to model payoff indeterminacy in discontinuous games. They prove the existence in every compact strategic game of a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. We extend their result to economies with externalities [1] where, by definition, players are restricted to pure strategies. We also provide a new interpretation of payoff indeterminacy in Simon and Zame's model in terms of preference incompleteness.

Keywords: Incomplete and Discontinuous Preferences; rasian Equilibrium; Wal; Better Reply Security; Economies; Generalized Games; Endogenous Sharing Rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Published in Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, 5 (2), pp.127-137. ⟨10.1007/s40505-017-0118-3⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01437507

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0118-3

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