Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty

Liza Charroin (), Bernard Fortin () and Marie Villeval ()
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Bernard Fortin: Département d'Economique, Université Laval - ULaval - Université Laval [Québec], CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi [Montréal] - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
Marie Villeval: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: If individuals tend to behave like their peers, is it because of conformity, that is, the preference of people to align behavior with the behavior of their peers; homophily, that is, the tendency of people to bond with similar others; or both? We address this question in the context of an ethical dilemma. Using a peer effect model allowing for homophily, we designed a real-effort laboratory experiment in which individuals could misreport their performance to earn more. Our results reveal a preference for conformity and for homophily in the selection of peers, but only among participants who were cheating in isolation. The size of peer effects is similar when identical peers were randomly assigned and when they were selected by individuals. We thus jointly reject the presence of a self-selection bias in the peer effect estimates and of a link strength effect.

Keywords: Peer Effects; Homophily; Dishonesty; Self-Selection Bias; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-ltv
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03196953v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in 2021

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Related works:
Working Paper: Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty (2021)
Working Paper: Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty (2021)
Working Paper: Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty (2021)
Working Paper: Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty (2021)
Working Paper: Homophily, Peer Effects, and Dishonesty (2021)
Working Paper: Homophily, peer effects and dishonesty (2018)
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