Les motivations de l'inscription des investissements en R&D à l'actif: Divulgation volontaire d'informations ou gestion des résultats ?

Samah Rebai Azouz ()
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Samah Rebai Azouz: Laboratoire R.E.P.O.N.S.E - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, IHEC - IHEC de Sfax

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Abstract: CEOs of french companies must choose between capitalizing R&D as an asset on the balance sheet, or showing it as an expense on the income statement. Whether they opt for one or the other reflects two managerial strategies which are different but not mutually exclusive - namely, to disseminate more information on R&D investment and/or to manage earnings. Based on a sample of 87 french industrial firms listed on the SBF 250 index in the 2000-2004 period, the results of the study show that R&D capitalization leads to an improvement of the voluntary disclosure index as regards R&D policy.

Keywords: accounting choices; disclosure index; earnings management; managerial discretion; R&D; choix comptables; indice de divulgation; gestion des résultats; discrétion managériale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino
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Published in Comptabilités, économie et société, May 2011, Montpellier, France. pp.cd-rom

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