Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known

Guillaume Carlier () and Rose-Anne Dana
Additional contact information
Guillaume Carlier: CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00661903v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148 (4), pp.1606-1623. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00661903v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00661903

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().