A rating-based network selection game in heterogeneous systems

Vladimir Fux () and Patrick Maillé ()
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Vladimir Fux: RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - European University of Brittany - Télécom Bretagne - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]
Patrick Maillé: RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - European University of Brittany - Télécom Bretagne - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]

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Abstract: During the last years the problem of network selection in wireless heterogeneous systems has attracted a lot of attention. Expecting that next generation mobile devices will allow connections to different types of networks, it is interesting to investigate the outcome of selfish behavior in that context. It may then be necessary to introduce some mechanisms to drive users choices to some desirable directions - quality of service (QoS) optimization, energy consumption minimization, network revenue maximization -. In this paper, we define and investigate a system where users decide which network to connect to based on some ratings of networks, possibly computed from feedback sent by other users. We then apply that model to investigate the pricing decisions made by network owners, in two different settings: a compe- tition among several revenue-oriented operators, or a revenue- maximizing monopoly. The outcomes of those settings are com- pared, in terms of network usage and energy consumption.

Keywords: Network selection; Game theory; Congestion control; Quality of service (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00725032v1
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Published in NGI 2012: 8th Euro-NF Conference on Next Generation Internet, Jun 2012, Karlskrona, Sweden

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