Competition between wireless service providers sharing a radio resource

Patrick Maillé (), Bruno Tuffin () and Jean-Marc Vigne ()
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Patrick Maillé: RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - European University of Brittany - Télécom Bretagne - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]
Bruno Tuffin: DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Centre Inria de l'Université de Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR - Université de Rennes - INSA Rennes - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Télécom Bretagne - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Jean-Marc Vigne: DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Centre Inria de l'Université de Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR - Université de Rennes - INSA Rennes - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Télécom Bretagne - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We present a model of competition on prices between two telecommunication service providers sharing an access resource, which can for example be the same WiFi spectrum. We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation and congestion level, and at the largest time scale, providers compete on prices. We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist. The pricing game is then solved by assuming that providers are risk- averse and try to maximize the minimal revenue they can get at a user equilibrium. We illustrate what can be the outcome of this game and that there are situations for which providers can co-exist.

Keywords: Game theory; Wireless networks; Pricing; Shared spectrum (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00725181v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in 11th International Networking Conference (NETWORKING), May 2012, Prague, Czech Republic. pp.355-365, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-30054-7_28⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00725181

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30054-7_28

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