Double moral hazard and the energy efficiency gap

Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet and S. Houde
Additional contact information
S. Houde: Department of Management Science and Engineering [Stanford] - Stanford University

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Moral hazard issues can deter profitable investments in energy efficiency. Energy-savings insurance and quality standards can mitigate the problem - yet not eliminate it.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene, nep-ias and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enpc.hal.science/hal-00799725v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in IAEE Energy Forum, 2013, pp.29-31

Downloads: (external link)
https://enpc.hal.science/hal-00799725v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Double Moral Hazard and the Energy Efficiency Gap (2015)
Working Paper: Double moral hazard and the energy efficiency gap (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00799725

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().