The core of games on ordered structures and graphs

Michel Grabisch

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Abstract: In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one has to deal with some unfeasible coalitions. Defining a game on a subcollection of the power set of the set of players has many implications on the mathematical structure of the core, depending on the precise structure of the subcollection of feasible coalitions. Many authors have contributed to this topic, and we give a unified view of these different results.

Keywords: TU-game; Solution concept; Core; Feasible coalition; Communication graph; Partially ordered set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00803233v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2013, 204 (1), pp.33-64. ⟨10.1007/s10479-012-1265-4⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: The core of games on ordered structures and graphs (2013)
Working Paper: The core of games on ordered structures and graphs (2013)
Working Paper: The core of games on ordered structures and graphs (2013)
Working Paper: The core of games on ordered structures and graphs (2009)
Working Paper: The core of games on ordered structures and graphs (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00803233

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-012-1265-4

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