The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting

Matias Nuñez

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Abstract: We show that Approval voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to his worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding, we provide sufficient conditions on the voters' preference intensities to remove this sort of insincerity. On the contrary, if the candidate gets a positive share of the votes, a voter might skip him solely on the basis of his ordinal preferences. This second type of insincerity is a consequence of the correlation of the candidates' scores. The incentives for sincerity of rank scoring rules are also discussed.

Keywords: Sincerity; Approval; voting; Poisson; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00917101
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Published in Economic Theory, 2013, pp.0938-2259. ⟨10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x⟩

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Journal Article: The strategic sincerity of Approval voting (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00917101

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x

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