Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment

Agnès Festré and Pierre Garrouste ()
Additional contact information
Pierre Garrouste: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party, in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject is introduced who either silently observes or observes and gives feedback by choosing one of seven messages consisting of varying degrees of (dis)satisfaction. We found that observation coupled with feedback significantly increases dictators' propositions, while no significant effect is found for observation-only. We conclude that regard by others matters only if it is linked to social factors such as communication. This complements the literature that argues that altruistic behavior is instrumental in serving other selfish (or non-purely altruistic) ends such as self-reputation or social approval. This experiment contributes to the growing literature aimed at decreasing the artificiality of DG designs, by increasing their practicability and external validity

Keywords: social psychology; game theory; communication; beliefs; altruistic behavior; observation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01069807v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014, 45, pp.141-153. ⟨10.1016/j.joep.2014.09.005⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-01069807v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment (2014)
Working Paper: Somebody May Scold You! A Dictator Experiment (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01069807

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2014.09.005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().