Going with the flow: corruption in tax agencies

Hamilton Carvalho, Joaquim Rocha, Marcelo Ramos, Eduardo Franco () and José Mazzon
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Hamilton Carvalho: USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo
Joaquim Rocha: USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo
Marcelo Ramos: USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo
Eduardo Franco: USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo
José Mazzon: USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo

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Abstract: Corruption is a widespread "wicked " problem in the world, whose roots are still poorly understood by policy makers. The paper summarized the findings from the behavioral ethics literature, assembling a model to explain the creation and solidification of a culture of corruption in tax agencies in Brazil. The model represents the conversion of honest tax auditors into corrupt ones based on a process of rationalization that responds to social norms, the magnitude of illegal rewards, perceived risk and job quality. Four policies are simulated and only a policy that combines multiple interventions produces positive results. Overall, the model shows that a culture of corruption can be created and disseminated in few years, becoming resistant to change inasmuch as corrupt auditors occupy management positions and create alliances with politicians.

Keywords: Corruption; Behavioral ethics; Brazil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01370096v1
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Published in 34th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Jul 2016, Delf, Netherlands

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01370096

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