Large Spatial Competition

Matias Nuñez and Marco Scarsini

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Abstract: We consider spatial competition when consumers are arbitrarily distributed on a compact metric space. Retailers can choose one of finitely many locations in this space. We focus on symmetric mixed equilibria which exist for any number of retailers. We prove that the distribution of retailers tends to agree with the distribution of the consumers when the number of competitors is large enough. The results are shown to be robust to the introduction of (i) randomness in the number of retailers and (ii) different ability of the retailers to attract consumers.

Keywords: Location; Equilibrium; Hotelling games; Large games; Poisson games; Valence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-geo, nep-mic and nep-ure
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01512621v1
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Published in Lina Mallozzi, Egidio D'Amato, Panos M. Pardalos. Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory, Springer, pp.225-246, 2017, 978-3-319-52653-9. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10⟩

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Chapter: Large Spatial Competition (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01512621

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10

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