The inpact of the remuneration committee on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity

Rémunération des dirigeants et caractéristiques des comités de rémunérations des sociétés du SBF 120

Ali Dardour, Rim Boussaada () and Hazar Ben Barka
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Ali Dardour: École doctorale de Sciences de Gestion - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse

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Abstract: The research aims to study the influence of the remuneration committee characteristics on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Conducted on a sample of listed companies in the SBF 120 over the period 2010-2011, the results show that the number of directorships held by members and the number of committee meetings influence this sensitivity. Other measures such as the size of the committee, attendance, and the gender diversity have no effect. Furthermore, institutional investors are more active on their monitoring role than other types of shareholders. Their presence affects positively and significantly the pay for performance sensitivity.

Keywords: remuneration committee; CEO pay-performance sensitivity; Directorships; Gender diversity; Bo D independence; comités de rémunérations; sensibilité rémunération-performance; mandats; diversité genre (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sbm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02064451
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Published in Conférence internationale de gouvernance, Association Académique Internationale de Gouvernance, Jun 2015, Quebec, Canada

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02064451

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