Value creation and value appropriation in innovative coopetition projects

Paul Chiambaretto (), Jonathan Maurice () and Marc Willinger
Additional contact information
Paul Chiambaretto: MRM - Montpellier Research in Management - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School - UM - Université de Montpellier
Jonathan Maurice: TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article provides a formal model of the value creation-appropriation dilemma in the coopetition for innovation, i.e., alliances among competing firms. The model determines the levels of cooperation that maximize the profit of each firm in an innovative coopetition agreement regardless of the number of firms and their respective budget endowments dedicated to the coopetitive project. We answer the following questions. Within an innovative coopetition agreement, will the partners cooperate more or less when their budget endowments change? What is the impact on profit? When is it profitable to accept a new partner into the agreement? What happens to the remaining firms when a partner withdraws from the agreement? We show that when the coopetitive budget of the focal firm increases, the focal firm allocates a larger part of this budget to value creation activities and increases its profit. In contrast, when a partnering firm increases its coopetitive budget, the focal firm reduces its budget for value creation activities to maintain a sufficient budget for value appropriation activities. We also show that the addition of a competitor with a large coopetitive budget to the innovative coopetition agreement decreases the cooperation of the focal firm but increases the profit of the initial partnering firms. In contrast, the exit of a partnering firm with a large coopetitive budget from the agreement intensifies the cooperation among the remaining firms but reduces their profit

Keywords: coopetition; value creation; game theory; value appropriation; innovative coopetition projects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ppm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02497321v2
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in M@n@gement, 2020, 23 (2), pp.61-75. ⟨10.3917/mana.232.0061⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02497321v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Value creation and value appropriation in innovative coopetition projects (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02497321

DOI: 10.3917/mana.232.0061

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().