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Household bargaining, spouses'consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes

Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur () and Kerstin Roeder
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Jean-Marie Lozachmeur: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Kerstin Roeder: UNIA - Universität Augsburg [Deutschland] = University of Augsburg [Germany] = Université d'Augsburg [Allemagne]

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Abstract: We study optimal commodity taxes under household bargaining. We focus on the taxation of ‘female' and ‘male' products. The expressions for the tax rates include Pigouvian and incentive terms. When the female spouse has the lower bargaining weight, the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidization of the ‘female good', and a taxation of the ‘male good'. The incentive term depends on the distribution of bargaining weights across couples. When the bargaining weight of the female spouse increases with wages, the female good will be consumed in larger proportion by more productive couples. In this case the Pigouvian term is mitigated.

Keywords: Couples' taxation; Household bargaining; Optimal commodity taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03169803v1
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Published in Oxford Economic Papers, 2021, 73 (1), pp.225-247. ⟨10.1093/oep/gpz060⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Household bargaining, spouses’ consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Household Bargaining, Spouses' Consumption Patterns and the Design of Commodity Taxes (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Household bargaining, spouses' consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03169803

DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpz060

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