Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves

Johan Hombert, Jerome Pouyet and Nicolas Schutz
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Johan Hombert: HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

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Abstract: We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms,

Date: 2020-02-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-isf, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, 2020, 67 (3-4), pp.484-514. ⟨10.1111/joie.12204⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2019)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2019)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2019)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2013)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive vertical mergers waves (2009)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive vertical mergers waves (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03330587

DOI: 10.1111/joie.12204

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