An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option

Koffi Serge William Yao
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Koffi Serge William Yao: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants' behavior is mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity in payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, we show that there is neither an order effect nor a framing effect. Finally, the reduction persists when the Nash threat is no longer in place.

Keywords: laboratory group behavior; common pool resource; approval mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03418905
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Published in Games, 2021, 12 (4), pp.83. ⟨10.3390/g12040083⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03418905

DOI: 10.3390/g12040083

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