Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence

Marcus Pivato

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Abstract: How should we aggregate the ex ante preferences of Bayesian agents with heterogeneous beliefs? Suppose the state of the world is described by a random process that unfolds over time. Different agents have different beliefs about the probabilistic laws governing this process. As new information is revealed over time by the process, agents update their beliefs and preferences via Bayes rule. Consider a Pareto principle that applies only to preferences which remain stable in the long run under these updates. I show that this "eventual Pareto" principle implies that the social planner must be a utilitarian. But it does not impose any relationship between the beliefs of the individuals and those of the planner, except for a weak compatibility condition

Keywords: Subjective expected utility; Utilitarian; Ex ante Pareto; Stochastic process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, 200, pp.105399. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2021.105399⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03637877

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105399

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