Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation

Ingela Alger and Jean-François Laslier

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Abstract: This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03682814v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022, 34 (2), pp.280-312. ⟨10.1177/09516298221081811⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: Coordination and information aggregation (2022)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2022)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2020)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03682814

DOI: 10.1177/09516298221081811

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