Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries

Mohamed Mansour () and Eric Kamwa
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Mohamed Mansour: Université Paris-Dauphine Tunis

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt from an econometric study carried out on a sample of thirteen developed countries for macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996-2012. It comes out that the lack of consensus between the political parties in the government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.

Keywords: Public debt; Political governance; Democracy; Public choice; Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04177030v2
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Published in Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 2024, 39 (2), pp.163-179. ⟨10.1332/25156918Y2023D000000003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04177030

DOI: 10.1332/25156918Y2023D000000003

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