Electoral reform: the case for majority judgment

Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does MJ avoid the classical Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, but it also overcomes the domination paradox, from which paired comparisons by majority rule, approval voting, and all Condorcet consistent methods suffer. This article also shows why MJ best reduces the impact of strategic manipulation and minimizes ties to the extreme. The article illustrates the resistance of MJ to manipulations in a real example, discusses other salient properties of MJ, and summarizes several recent applications that show MJ to be, despite its newness, the right basis of electoral reform.

Keywords: Majority Judgment; Arrow paradox; Domination paradox; Resistance to strategy; Range voting; Approval voting; Rank choice voting; Condorcet paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Published in Constitutional Political Economy, 2022, 34, pp.346 - 356. ⟨10.1007/s10602-022-09385-7⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04304795

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09385-7

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