The economics of new product launches and access to pharmaceutical products in the EU: A perspective on the EC’s proposed reform of the EU pharmaceutical legislation
Margaret Kyle (),
Sinan Corus and
Julia Tanndal
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Margaret Kyle: CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
One goal of the European Commission's proposed reform to existing regulations is to increase patient access to innovative medicines across the European Union. We describe the economic impact of this policy change. Because of the incentives created by other policies, particularly external reference pricing and parallel trade, these reforms may have an adverse impact on competition in the pharmaceutical sector and reduce the attractiveness of Europe as an incubator for pharmaceutical innovation. Changes to bargaining power are likely to favour large, established firms. These reforms also increase the uncertainty of the length of market exclusivity, potentially undermining innovation incentives.
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eec, nep-eur and nep-reg
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Published in Concurrences [Competition law journal / Revue des droits de la concurrence], 2023, 2023 (3), pp.44-49
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04351643
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