Payments for environmental services with ecological thresholds: farmers’ preferences for a sponsorship bonus

Fanny Le Gloux (), Carole Ropars-Collet (), Alice Issanchou and Pierre Dupraz
Additional contact information
Fanny Le Gloux: SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement
Carole Ropars-Collet: SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement
Alice Issanchou: SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Designing incentives for agri-environmental public good provision with threshold effects calls for payment mechanisms favouring critical mass participation and continuity of commitments at the landscape scale. We conducted a choice experiment to test the acceptability of a bonus in a scheme for improving river water quality in France. We introduce a sponsorship bonus each time the farmer convinces a peer into entering the scheme, which can be combined with a collective result bonus per hectare if the river reaches a higher step on the water quality scale. We consider the involvement of local financers could increase the willingness to pay beyond opportunity costs and income foregone and propose higher levels of payment than agri-environmental schemes. Results suggest a sponsorship bonus on its own is cost-effective. We characterize respondents' heterogeneity and identify three groups based on choice patterns: (i) "pro-environment individualists", (ii) "management change averse" farmers, and (iii) "pro-incentive" farmers.

Keywords: Water quality; Choice experiment; Collective action; Mixed logit model; Latent class model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dcm and nep-env
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04523614v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2024, pp.1-28. ⟨10.1080/09640568.2024.2303738⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04523614v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Payments for environmental services with ecological thresholds: farmers’ preferences for a sponsorship bonus (2023)
Working Paper: Payments for environmental services with ecological thresholds: farmers' preferences for a sponsorship bonus (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04523614

DOI: 10.1080/09640568.2024.2303738

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().