Why royalties ? Evidence from French distribution networks

Muriel Fadairo ()
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Muriel Fadairo: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships in distribution networks. In the framework of agency theory, I study the royalty rate as an incentive device for the upstream firm in maintaining brand-name value, using recent French data to estimate probit models. The results are consistent with the analytical framework.

Keywords: Vertical Relationships; Distribution Networks; Contract Design; Two-sided moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00560208v3
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Published in 2011

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00560208

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