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Multi-Item Auctions

Gabrielle Demange, Gale David and Marilda Sotomayor (marildas@usp.br)
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Gale David: Department of Economics [Berkeley] - UC Berkeley - University of California [Berkeley] - UC - University of California

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Abstract: A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item. Assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items, it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidders. In this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms: one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy.

Keywords: Matching; Multi-item auctions; Sequential auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (189)

Published in Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94 (4), pp.863-872

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670982

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