Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Nicolas Jacquemet () and Frederic Koessler

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information does not always coincide with the theoretical prediction, the qualitative properties of the value of information are satisfied in the laboratory: (i) it is never negative, (ii) it decreases with the number of repetitions, (iii) it is bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game, and (iv) it is bounded above by the value of the one-shot game. In line with the theory, the empirical use of private information is almost complete when it should be, and decreases in longer interactions.

Keywords: Concealment of information; Laboratory experiments; Value of information; Zero-sum repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00773412v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, 78, pp.103-120. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.002⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00773412v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information (2013)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2013)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00773412

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().