Reputation and social (dis)approval in feedback mechanisms: An experimental study

Marianne Lumeau (), David Masclet () and Thierry Pénard
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Marianne Lumeau: CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: (dis)approbation; trust game; experiment; feedback mechanism; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01116889v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, 112, pp.127-140. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.002⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reputation and social (dis)approval in feedback mechanisms: An experimental study (2015)
Working Paper: Reputation and Social (Dis)approval in Feedback Mechanisms: An Experimental study (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01116889

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.002

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