An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games

Takashi Yamada and Nobuyuki Hanaki
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Takashi Yamada: Faculty of Global and Science Studies, Yamaguchi University

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Abstract: We experimentally study Lowest Unique Integer Games (LUIGs). In a LUIG, N (>= 3) players submit a positive integer up to M and the player choosing the smallest number not chosen by anyone else wins. LUIGs are simplified versions of real systems such as lottery games and Lowest/Highest Unique Bid Auctions that have been attracting attention from scholars, yet experimental studies are still scarce. Here, we consider four LUIGs with N={3,4} and M={3,4}. We find that (a) choices made by a majority of subjects over 50 rounds of a LUIG were not significantly different from that in the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) of the LUIG; however, (b) those subjects who behaved significantly differently from what the MSE predicts won the game more frequently than those who behaved similarly to what the MSE predicts.

Keywords: Laboratory Experiment; Lowest Unique Integer Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2016, 463, pp.88-102. ⟨10.1016/j.physa.2016.06.108⟩

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Journal Article: An experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games (2016)
Working Paper: An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01204814

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2016.06.108

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