Competition policy as a lever for industrial policy: Some reflections on horizontal cartels prosecution in the post-war France

La politique de concurrence comme levier de la politique industrielle dans la France de l’après-guerre

Claude Didry and Frédéric Marty

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The Establishment of the cartels technical committee in 1953, which prefigured the contemporary French competition authority, seems to participate in the same movement than the German competition law and the Treaty of Rome four years later. However some differences have to be put into relief. First, it didn't deal with individual abuses of dominance. Second, the collusive practices targeted mainly concerned bid-rigging in public procurement in the reconstruction and modernisation plan. Thus, if this competition policy experience contrasts with war experiences and the interwar period arguments for a regulated competition, it cannot be assimilated with West German one, inspired by the Ordoliberal School. Sanctioning horizontal collusion makes sense within an industrial policy model based on a close co-operation between Government and some national champions. In that sense, the French competition law beginnings may be analysed as a tool for ensuring the implementation of a vertically conceived industrial policy.

Keywords: competition policy; cartel agreements; neoliberalism; utilities.; politiques de concurrence; cartels; néo-libéralisme; services publics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-his and nep-ind
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01208103v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2015

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01208103v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: COMPETITION POLICY AS A LEVER FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON HORIZONTAL CARTELS PROSECUTION IN THE POST-WAR FRANCE (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01208103

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().