Optimality of deductible for Yaari's model: a reappraisal

Alain Chateauneuf, Michèle Cohen, Mina Mostoufi and Jean-Christophe Vergnaud

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Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to show that left monotone risk aversion, a meaningful refinement of strong risk aversion, characterizes Yaari's decision makers for whom deductible insurance is optimal. A second goal is to offer a detailed proof of the deductible's computation, which proves the tractability of Yaari's model under left-monotone risk aversion.

Keywords: Yaari's model; Jewitt's left-monotone risk aversion; optimality of deductible; optimalité du contrat de franchise; modèle de Yaari; left-monotone risk aversion de Jewitt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01224502v1
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Published in 2015

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Working Paper: Optimality of deductible for Yaari's model: a reappraisal (2015)
Working Paper: Optimality of deductible for Yaari's model: a reappraisal (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01224502

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