Strategic behaviour in road cycling competitions

La stratégie dans les courses cyclistes sur route

Jean-François Mignot

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Abstract: Why is there strategy, not just brute force, in cycling competitions? What are the recurring strategic interactions among riders? And what can economists learn from riders' behaviors? This chapter first provides an overview on the main reasons why bicycle races are strategic and not just a mere display of brute force. Next, several game-theory analyses of strategic interactions between riders are presented: attack timing strategy, cooperation and noncooperation in breakaways and in the peloton, three-player interactions and sprint strategy. It is founded on examples of strategic interactions between riders that occurred in the Tour de France, the Giro d'Italia, the Vuelta a España and other races.

Keywords: Cycling; Cycling performance; Cycling sprint; Game Theory; Sport Sciences; Sport economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tre
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01326720v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in The Economics of Professional Road Cycling, , pp.207-231, 2016, 978-3-319-22312-4. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-22312-4⟩

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Related works:
Chapter: Strategic Behavior in Road Cycling Competitions (2022)
Working Paper: Strategic Behavior in Road Cycling Competitions (2022)
Chapter: Strategic Behavior in Road Cycling Competitions (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01326720

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-22312-4

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