Coordination with communication under oath

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stéphane Luchini (), Jason Shogren and Adam Zylbersztejn ()
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Stéphane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Adam Zylbersztejn: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.

Keywords: Coordination game; Cheap talk communication; Oath (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01480525v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Experimental Economics, 2018, 21 (3), pp.627-649. ⟨10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2015)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2015)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2011)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01480525

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x

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