The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games

Sébastien Courtin (), Zéphirin Nganmeni and Bertrand Tchantcho
Additional contact information
Sébastien Courtin: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Zéphirin Nganmeni: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Bertrand Tchantcho: ENSPY - Ecole Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique de Yaoundé - UY1 - Université de Yaoundé I

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This work focuses on multi-type games in which there are a number of non-ordered types in the input, while the output consists of a single real value. When considering the dichotomous case, we extend the Shapley-Shubik power index and provide a full characterization of this extension. Our results generalize the literature on classical cooperative games.

Keywords: Game theory; Multi-type games; Simple games; Shapley-Shubik index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01545769v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2016, 81 (3), pp.413-426. ⟨10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01545769v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01545769

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().