Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games

Claude Meidinger ()
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Claude Meidinger: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Whether there is a pre-existing common "language" that ties down the literal meanings of cheap talk messages or not is a distinction plainly important in practice. But it is assumed irrelevant in traditional game theory because it affects neither the payoff structure nor the theoretical possibilities for signaling. And when in experiments the "common-language" assumption is simplicitly implemented, such situations ignore the meta-coordination problem created by communication. Players must coordinate their beliefs on what various messages mean before they can use messages to coordinate on what to do. Using simulations with populations of artificial agents, the paper investigates the way according to which a common meaning can be constituted through a collective process of learning and compares the results thus obtained with those available in some experiments.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Computational Economics; Signaling games; Economie expérimentale; Economie computationnelle; Jeux avec communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01960762v1
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Published in 2018

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01960762

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