Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence

David Masclet (), Claude Montmarquette and Nathalie Viennot-Briot
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Nathalie Viennot-Briot: CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal

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Keywords: laboratory experiment.; ambiguous risk; fiscal fraud; whistleblowers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-iue and nep-pub
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02301968v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2019, 83, pp.101459. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2019.101459⟩

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Journal Article: Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02301968

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101459

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